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Abstract 
To avoid irreversible damage to global ecosystems, new “green” technologies are needed. Some of 
those are still far from commercial maturity. In such cases, governments may create temporary 
rents to make investments “artificially” attractive. The creation of such rents, however, involves 
risks of misallocation and political capture. This article looks at rent management in the case of 
India's National Solar Mission. So far, the mission has been remarkably effective in triggering 
solar investments and keeping the necessary subsidies manageable through a process of competi-
tive reverse bidding for tariffs. Moreover, policy design and implementation showed a good deal 
of experimentation and learning. Some risks remain, especially regarding the enforceability of 
renewable energy quotas at the level of Indian states. On the whole, however, first experiences 
indicate that “green rents” have been managed in a fairly effective way. 
  
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
In researching for this article, we interviewed a number of market participants from the public and pri-
vate sectors. Private sector interviewees were particularly apprehensive about being quoted directly 
about their strategy, business practice, expectations or challenges regarding this early-stage market that 
is developing dynamically. Many aspects of the market lack transparency. In order to protect the inter-
viewees’ anonymity without sacrificing insights that are important for our analysis, we agreed on a 
modified version of the ‘Chatham House Rules’ whereby we would not attribute quotes to individuals. 
Over the course of 2011 and 2012, we spoke with staff from the following companies:  
1. Investors/project developers: Azure Power, Moser Baer, Solaire Direct, Kiran Energy, Welspun, 
Mahindra, Aditya Birla, SAIL, GAIL, GreenInfra, SaiSudhir, PR Fonroche. 
2. Module manufacturers: First Solar, REC, Sharp, Q-Cells.  
3. Inverter manufacturers: Solar One, Bonfiglioli, SMA. 
4. Providers of Energy Performance Certificates: Juwi, Larsen & Toubro, Vikram Solar, Warree, 
Soleg, IBC Solar. 
5. International cooperation agencies and other market observers: World Bank, Asian Development 
Bank, International Finance Corporation, GIZ, KfW, DfID, Council on Energy, Environment and 
Water and the Centre for Science and Environment. 
Indian Government bodies including Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Central Electricity Regu-
latory Commission, State Electricity Regulatory Commissions and the Low Carbon Task Force of the 
Planning Commission. 
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CERC Central Electricity Commission 
CSP Concentrating Solar Power 
DfID Department for International Development 
EPC Engineering, Procurement, Construction 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GHG greenhouse gas 
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
GW Gigawatt 
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Introduction 
Sir Nicholas Stern has called climate change “a result of the greatest market failure that the world 
has seen,”1 because it has potentially huge global effects for the whole world’s inhabitants. In or-
der to keep global warming within tolerable limits, new mitigation technologies must be developed 
and many conventional greenhouse gas-emitting technological trajectories disrupted. The areas in 
which it is necessary to accelerate major technological breakthroughs are well known: renewable 
energy and energy storage technologies, carbon capture and storage technologies, new resource-
saving materials, new mobility concepts and more eco-efficient agricultural technologies – to 
name just a few. In most cases, it could take years, or even decades, until carbon-efficient tech-
nologies become competitive in the market place. To accelerate their development, reliable long-
term policy frameworks are required with attractive subsidies and/or guarantees that reduce the 
risk and bridge early development and commercial success. In economists’ terms, rents need to be 
created, that is, investors need to be able to earn above-average returns in the new green industries 
for as long as needed to build up physical capacities, acquire capabilities and make these industries 
competitive.  
Creating rents for supporting specific industries can, however, have two undesirable effects 
(Chang 2006). Policymakers tend to act on incomplete information that can lead them to make 
wrong choices and support technologies which never become commercially viable, and the possi-
bility of earning above-average returns in regulated markets creates a strong incentive for rent-
seeking, that is, lobbyists will try to influence regulations in order to increase their rents or stretch 
them over longer periods of time than are necessary for developing the new industries (‘political 
capture’). Thus the challenge for policymakers is to manage rents so that they reach the targets 
with a minimum of political capture and waste of taxpayer and consumer money.  
Rent management is especially demanding when pressing environmental problems require that 
established technological trajectories be disrupted and new generations of technologies developed. 
In such cases, policymakers must often design support schemes without knowing which technolo-
gies will become the commercially successful ‘dominant design’ (Anderson / Tushman 1990) – or 
the specific capital requirements, the speed with which economies of scale will reduce unit produc-
tion costs, how long it will take until the new technologies reach cost parity with incumbent tech-
nologies, and to what extent the new activity will create knowledge spillovers in related activities. 
All this makes it very difficult to determine the necessary amount and duration of subsidies or 
protection. At the same time, uncertainty increases the scope for rent-seeking: industry lobbies 
have strong incentives to overstate the need for subsidies and protection. Governments must take 
the trial-and-error approach to testing various policy options and continuously adjust their support 
in view of the market’s changing realities. 
This article explores how the Government of India creates and allocates rents in its attempt to 
promote solar energy generation, how it tries to minimise political capture and how it tests and 
fine-tunes its policies. This case is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, energy from the 
sun is a socially desirable source of energy that deserves and requires long-term policy support: it 
is practically emissions-free, is more abundant than other renewable energies in many countries, 
and can be locally generated, which furthers development. At the same time, solar energy remains 
considerably more expensive than energy from other sources (conventional, as well as hydro or 
                                                            
1 http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/nov/29/climatechange.carbonemissions 
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biomass) and therefore requires steadfast support until it achieves grid parity. The Government of 
India has recently adopted a ‘National Solar Mission’ that includes a range of new incentives, and 
some Indian state governments are also experimenting with support measures. India thus provides 
a unique ‘laboratory’ for learning about solar policy.  
This article has four sections. Section 1 explains why governments need to create rents in order to 
channel resources into environmentally more sustainable new technologies. It also addresses the 
risks of government failure and political capture. Section 2 explores the rationale for using solar 
energy in India and provides an overview of the country’s solar energy policies. Section 3 analyses 
two key aspects of these policies from the perspective of rent management: (a) how governments 
determine the right level of preferential tariffs for solar energy, and (b) how state-level renewable 
energy targets are politically negotiated and linked to a certificate trading scheme. Both aspects 
have far-reaching implications for the creation and transfer of rents. Section 4 concludes.  
1 The promotion of green technologies and the creation of rents 
1.1 The enhanced role of public policy in promoting “green” technologies 
New resource-saving technologies are needed in order to avoid major, often irreversible, damage 
to global ecosystems. The development of these ‘green technologies’ must be policy-driven – 
much more than in other fields of technology development, where market-driven search processes 
prevail (Altenburg / Pegels 2012, 11 ff.; World Bank 2012, 65 ff.). This is because the current rate 
of global-ecosystems degradation threatens to reach environmental tipping points that will create 
ecosystem disequilibria with unparalleled negative consequences for mankind (Stern 2007). De-
veloping and deploying technologies for the sustainable use of resources is of utmost urgency. 
Furthermore, this must be achieved quickly, especially with regard to climate change mitigation. If 
global greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase for another decade, many consequences may 
become irreversible, while the cost of abatement will grow exponentially (IPCC 2007; McKinsey 
2009). 
Innovation processes should be as market-driven as possible in order to ensure that demand is met 
effectively. Incentives should preferably aim at general policy targets, such as energy saving or 
emissions reduction, without prescribing specific technological solutions. Governments can 
achieve a lot by enhancing market transparency, educating the general public, training technicians, 
setting standards and certifying market players, or taxing the use of scarce resources. With regards 
to innovations for sustainable development, however, market-based allocation alone is not likely to 
suffice for developing the necessary new technologies and replacing the unsustainable old ones 
before the onset of irreversible environmental damage.  
1. Many environmental innovations require more than a decade or two to develop a new tech-
nology, run pilot tests and establish full-scale commercial operations (Kramer / Haigh 2009, 
568). Given the risk of environmental tipping points, unsustainable technologies need to be 
replaced quickly.  
2. Cumulative market failures are holding back investments in innovations for environmental 
sustainability (Stern 2007). Similar to other public goods, the social value for current and fu-
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ture generations of many ecosystem services is not reflected in their cost. Moreover, investing 
in new technologies that are far from the commercial frontier requires early investors to risk 
the full costs of failure, while in successful cases, much of the potential gain is likely to be 
reaped by other market actors. Finally, information and coordination failures are particularly 
severe when systemic changes are needed – such as changing from high to low-carbon energy 
or transport systems (Altenburg / Pegels 2012, 12). 
3. Lock-in effects such as path-dependent consumer behaviour and incentives to continue ex-
ploiting aged, depreciated industrial infrastructure hinder efforts to replace outdated technolo-
gies (Unruh 2000).  
4. With regard to energy systems, investments in renewable-energy technologies such as solar, 
hydro and wind are often not ‘bankable’ because although the running costs are minimal, con-
siderable capital investment must be made upfront. In contrast, in conventional power plants a 
larger share of running costs are distributed over the plant’s lifetime and can be adjusted to 
changes in the energy market, thereby reducing investment risks for banks. In addition, it is 
more difficult to access credit for new technologies without established track records than for 
old ones. 
Public policy is needed to correct these market failures and make green technologies more profit-
able than less sustainable ones. In economic terms, policies must create rents to lure capital into 
socially desirable green investments. Rents are defined as “payment[s] to a resource owner above 
the amount his resources would command in their next best alternative use” (Tollison 1982, 577), 
or more simply, returns that are higher than opportunity returns. ‘Opportunity returns’ (and also 
‘rents’) cannot be precisely quantified since investors expect different rates of return for specific 
activities, depending on the perceived risks and strategic considerations. 
Already temporary rents have accelerated mass production and deployment in a range of green 
technologies, spurred technological learning and permitted producers to reap economies of scale. 
In the case of photovoltaic (PV) solar technology, the cost of electricity generation has decreased 
by 22% each time the globally installed cumulative generation capacity doubled (IRENA 2012, I); 
the figure for wind turbines is 10% (Staffhorst 2006). The German Advisory Council on Global 
Change estimates similar learning curve effects for electricity generation from biomass and solar 
thermal-power plants (WBGU 2011, 167 f.). As a result, the cost gap in relation to competing in-
cumbent technologies has decreased substantially, meaning that subsidies can – and should be – 
reduced, and soon may be discontinued. 
1.2 The risks of government failure 
Creating rents through policy decisions can be risky:  
For starters, policymakers may take the wrong decisions and support technologies that never be-
come commercially viable. Critics of technology selection have long argued that governments do 
not know who will win any better than markets do (Pack / Saggi 2006). This argument overlooks 
two aspects: First, governments bring a public welfare perspective. Certain technologies may be 
socially more desirable than others, perhaps because of environmental externalities, or due to dy-
namic spillover effects that are not adequately reflected in the decisions made by individual inves-
tors: the best choice of a technology from the perspective of an individual investor may not be the 
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best for the society as a whole. Second, governments may facilitate technology-specific collective 
action and thereby help overcome failures of coordination in the market place (Lin / Monga 2010). 
These arguments justify technological targeting. The risks of faulty allocation should not be un-
derestimated, however: examples abound of governments wasting resources on technologies that 
never achieve maturity.2 While failed experiments are part of research, subsidised processes 
should be closely monitored and have built-in learning loops that allow policymakers to adapt 
instruments and keep policy costs as low as possible (Altenburg 2011).     
Further, government intervention creates incentives for rent-seeking and political capture, that is, 
attempts to lobby for government regulations that enable the lobbyist to capture economic rents 
(Krueger 1974; Murphy / Shleifer / Vishny 1993). The scope for rent-seeking is particularly large 
in green technology promotion, because urgent environmental problems force policymakers to 
support the search for new technologies with incomplete information. The more immature the 
technology, and the more it depends on broader policy changes, the greater the uncertainty about 
which technological alternative will become commercially viable first and how long competing 
technologies will take to become commercially viable; if investing early will give the country an 
advantage in the form of new exports, additional employment and/or knowledge spillovers; the 
size of such effects relative to the investments required upfront; and the amount of subsidy or pro-
tection needed to most efficiently achieve these targets. The choice of technologies also implies 
trade-offs – such as between nuclear risks and carbon emissions – and therefore involves subjec-
tive value judgements that can, and usually are, politically contested (Altenburg / Pegels 2012). 
All this increases the uncertainty, and thus the scope for rent-seeking. Empirical evidence shows 
that where rents have been created to promote green technologies, rent-seeking and political cap-
ture have often been observed. Helm (2010) demonstrates this for the European Emissions Trading 
System and renewable energy subsidies. Gerasimchuk et al. (2012, 21 f.) explain why beneficiar-
ies of bio-fuel subsidies are successfully lobbying against subsidy reform; annual bio-fuel subsi-
dies are expected to increase from USD 22 billion in 2010 to USD 67 billion in 2035, despite in-
creasing evidence that questions their record regarding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction 
and food prices (ibid.).  
The challenge for policymakers is thus to accelerate the development and deployment in ways that 
minimise the political capture and waste of taxpayer and consumer money. Given the quantity of 
resources concerned – Stern estimates that reducing greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst 
impacts of climate change will cost around 2% of global annual GDP3 – climate policy expendi-
tures must be prevented being turned into unproductive rents. Helm (2010, 182) argues that rent-
seeking and political capture are likely to drive the actual costs of carbon mitigation much higher 
than the Stern Review estimated. 
                                                            
2 For example, beginning in the 1960s, fast breeder-reactor development was heavily subsidised, but 
after several decades of expensive experimentation most countries abandoned the technology or shut 
down plants for economic or safety reasons (Waltar / Reynolds 1981). 
3  The Stern Review (Stern 2007) originally estimated 1%, but in 2008 the author raised his estimate of 
the annual cost of achieving stabilisation between 500 and 550 ppm to 2% of global annual GDP (The 
Guardian, 26 June 2008).  
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1.3 Rent management 
The concept of ‘rent management’ enters here. Rent management refers to the way governments 
create or withdraw rents and they influence allocation for different purposes among various actors. 
Using the findings of Khan (2004; 2008) and Altenburg (2011), effective rent management is un-
derstood as the capability to:  
1. Clearly define political targets and priorities and translate them into policies. Rents 
should be increased as long as they accelerate the accumulation of physical and human capital 
in specific desirable technologies that will pay off in the future. When investors pocket rents 
without reinvesting them in the desired capacities and capabilities, the optimum rent has been 
surpassed. In developing green technologies, policymakers may pursue various targets, and 
allocate rents accordingly. Typically, policies are driven by several concerns – such as climate 
change mitigation, local pollution and energy security – while they also exploit opportunities 
for new competitive advantages and additional jobs. The way rents are allocated depends on 
the prioritisation of targets. When governments seek to accelerate deployment to mitigate 
climate change, they link the rents to emissions avoidance, whereas if they wish to focus on 
technological learning, they may use local content requirements or trade restrictions to privi-
lege domestic over foreign producers. Possible trade-offs include restrictions on investment 
and trade that increase costs and retard the diffusion of greener technologies. Trade-offs need 
to be carefully assessed to determine the most appropriate mix of instruments and allocation 
of rents. More complex, multidimensional policy regimes increase the likelihood of political 
capture (Zenghelis 2011, 13). 
2. Determine the amount of rents needed at any given moment. This task is particularly chal-
lenging for three reasons: First, rents are returns above ‘opportunity returns’. Ideally, policy-
makers should be able to assess the level of subsidies that are needed to make certain invest-
ments more attractive than alternative investment opportunities. Investors expect different re-
turns on investment depending on their perception of the risks involved in each specific activ-
ity. It is especially difficult to assess ‘decent’ subsidy levels when information on key pa-
rameters – such as industry-specific risk premiums, future prices of different inputs and out-
puts, rates of technological progress and environmental externalities – is incomplete. The dif-
ficulty increases when governments promote the shift to fundamentally new technological tra-
jectories (e.g. combustion engines to electric vehicles) and several technologies compete to 
become the dominant design (e.g. fuel-cell vs. battery-electric vs. hybrid vehicles). Second, 
rents must be adapted to the life cycle of the respective industry. Rents must be higher for 
immature industries, while they can be reduced when firms are able to produce more effi-
ciently due to technological learning and economies of scale. In addition, it is not easy to de-
termine the right moment to enter an emerging industry: it could be opportune to promote the 
industry in its infancy to gain early-mover advantages but it also might be better to wait until 
pioneers elsewhere have solved the initial problems and proven the industry’s viability. Third, 
principal-agent problems increase the policymakers’ level of uncertainty (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Principal-agent problems arise when the economic actors who implement the policy (the 
‘agents’) are not pursuing the same interests as the governments (the ‘principal’) and the for-
mer take advantage of the latter’s lack of information about concrete operation parameters. 
Agents may, for example, try to increase their rents by falsely claiming greater production 
costs and social benefits (such as employment effects and knowledge spillovers). Rent man-
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agement refers to efforts to discover the actual costs in view of information asymmetries so as 
to establish the optimal rents levels. 
3.  Make credible long-term commitments. Policies that pursue long-term goals, such as 
switching from high- to low-carbon energy or transport systems, must guarantee stable rents 
for fairly long periods, especially when the upfront investments for infrastructure, research 
and manufacturing are high, future market prospects are uncertain, and a lot of time is needed 
to lower costs to competitive levels. It is difficult to guarantee long-term rents because people 
are often unable to accurately balance current and future costs and benefits (‘cognitive myo-
pia’) and don’t want to make immediate investments even if the future gains may be large 
(World Bank 2012, 50). In the same vein, politicians tend to prioritise actions that increase 
their popularity among current (rather than future) constituencies; in parliamentarian democ-
racies, actions usually have to show results within the same electoral cycle. Tensions can arise 
between the need to make credible long-term commitments and the need to experiment and 
continuously adjust policies to changing market realities. 
4.  Increase, cap, or withdraw rents despite political lobbyists. Rent management is about 
reallocating rents among producers, consumers and taxpayers. To begin with, creating rents is 
likely to be resisted by those who have to foot the bill. Then, as infant industries get closer to 
commercial parity, the rents have to be discontinued. If new industries experience very suc-
cessful uptake – thereby increasing the absolute level of rents to be borne by taxpayers or 
consumers – subsidies may become unsustainable and require capping.4 Any reduction or 
elimination of rents is imposed on their earlier beneficiaries. The necessity of adapting rents 
over time conflicts with the investors’ need for calculable policy frameworks that can bring 
returns on investments above the ‘usual’ rate of returns. When it is not possible to give long-
term guarantees for the absolute level of rents (such as a fixed 25-year premium on energy 
purchases), it is necessary to have clear and reliable rules regarding the adaptation of rents. 
Briefly, policy must create rents to trigger the development and deployment of specific technolo-
gies, often over protracted periods and under considerable uncertainty regarding the rents that are 
needed and the timeframe before the rents can be phased out. This is particularly true for the en-
ergy sector because of its environmental externalities, long investment cycles and major infrastruc-
tural challenges that require political negotiations with many stakeholders. These sector conditions 
increase the scope for rent-seeking and make rent management a formidable task. Rent manage-
ment presupposes what Evans (1995) calls ‘embedded autonomy’: The state must be so ‘embed-
ded’ with market actors that it understands cost structures and the rationale of investment decisions 
and can determine the most efficient level and duration of rents. At the same time, the state must 
be authorised to increase or cut rents without falling prey to rent-seekers. This calls for policy-
learning skills. The great uncertainties that lie in the pathways for green transformation require 
policymakers to experiment with various policies, and continuously adapt them based on their 
performance and changes in the framework conditions.  
                                                            
4  In Germany, for example, net subsidies for electricity from renewable sources soared from USD 0.9 
billion in 2000 to USD 12.4 billion in 2011 (IW 2011), which the led to a substantial revision of the 
subsidy regime.  
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2 Solar energy use in India: Rationale and policy 
2.1 The rationale for solar energy use in India 
India has a huge energy deficit. In 2009, 40% of Indian households were not connected to 
electricity grids (Greenpeace 2009). Power cuts cost an estimated EUR 39 billion per year, 
while over the past 30 years the gap between electricity generation and consumption has wid-
ened (Figure 1). The power deficit is expected to reach 600 GW by 2050 (dena 2012, 35).  
Figure 1: Increasing power deficit 
Source: Central Electricity Authority 
The 11th Five-Year-Plan (2007–2012) set the ambitious target of an annual increase of 9.5% in 
electricity production (MoP 2010). In India, power generation relies mainly on fossil-fuel sources 
– in 2008, it was 82.3% (IEA 2010) – and greenhouse gases emissions per kWh are high because 
of the use of outdated technologies.  
At the same time, India has huge potential for solar energy. On average, India enjoys 300 
sunny days each year and receives an hourly radiation of 200 MW/km2. According to one es-
timate, if 1% of India’s land mass was used for solar energy projects, installed solar capacity 
would reach 800 GW, or around five times India’s current total installed power capacity 
(Engelmeier et al. 2011). Solar power could cover India’s long-term power requirements. So-
lar energy could also reduce the emissions intensity of India's energy mix and save a lot on 
foreign exchange. In 2009, oil and derivatives accounted for 26.4% of all Indian imports (dena 
2012, 21).  
Climate change mitigation is not the main driver of solar energy promotion in India. Although 
the ‘National Solar Mission’ policy was declared in India’s National Action Plan on Climate 
Change, improving energy access and securing energy provision have higher priority. India’s 
government expect that old industrialised countries – who bear historical responsibility for the 
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and whose current per-capita emissions 
are still far above the average of developing countries – should assume the bulk of mitigation 
costs (see Rajamani 2007).  
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While India’s solar power installations were almost negligible at the end of 2010, one and a half 
years later, in August 2012, India’s installed solar capacity (mostly PV) surpassed 1 GW.5 This 
sudden, rapid growth resulted from government policies that created attractive rents (see Section 
2.2). Solar power prices cannot yet compete with traditional sources of energy, however. In July 
2011 solar power from utility-scale systems cost more than three times as much as coal power 
(Engelmeier et al. 2011). Other renewable energy sources – particularly hydro and wind power – 
are closer to grid parity, the point where it becomes economically attractive for investors to shift 
from finite and polluting fossil to infinite and clean solar energy sources (World Bank 2010, 
22 ff.). But since the most appropriate sites for these technologies are already being exploited, 
there is limited potential to expand capacity. Solar and other renewable energy sources are already 
competitive in a number of niche markets, especially where users are not connected to grids and 
where they can complement (without storage) or replace (with storage) the costly diesel back-up 
systems that mitigate India's frequent power cuts. Given the steep increase of energy prices in In-
dia over the last years (Figure 2), solar energy is a very promising source of renewable energy. 
Figure 2: Rising electricity costs in India 
 
Source: own calculations on the basis of data from State Electricity  
Regulatory Commissions 
The rapidly rising demand for power and increasing fossil-fuel prices are expected to swiftly reduce 
solar energy’s relative cost disadvantage. As shown by IRENA (2012, I), economies of scale in produc-
tion and deployment have lowered international PV module costs by 22% with every doubling of ca-
pacity, and the prospects for continued cost reductions are very good due to the very rapid growth of 
the PV market as well as strong competition. Hence, there is a rationale for temporarily subsidising the 
production and deployment of solar energy technologies in order to reach grid parity as soon as possi-
ble.  
Subsidies, however, are politically very sensitive. Given that several hundred million Indians are 
poor and deprived of basic services, it is hard to justify using scarce public resources for projects 
that are not directly linked to alleviating poverty and might even result in higher prices for con-
sumers. Renewables do not rank particularly high on the energy policy agenda. Political priorities 
include energy security, increased power generation and grid capacity, and improving access to 
energy grids. The fact that energy for agricultural use currently costs nothing in some parts of In-
                                                            
5  http://www.energynext.in/grid-connected-solar-power-capacity-india-reaches-1040-67-mw-2012-says-
mnre-minister/ 
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dia while electricity theft is prevalent indicates the difficulty in charging rates to cover the costs of 
energy (to say nothing of pricing environmental externalities). As a consequence, utilities run huge 
losses (Power Finance Corp. Ltd. 2011; Joseph 2010). Against this backdrop, promoting new 
sources of energy that are not yet price-competitive is a formidable task, although in the long term 
it is highly desirable for economic development and the environment.  
2.2 India’s solar energy policies 
In India, solar energy research and local pilot schemes have been promoted at a low level for many 
years. In 1981, a Commission for Additional Sources of Energy was created, which in 1992 be-
came the world’s first ministry dedicated to renewable energy promotion (since 2006, it has been 
known as the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, or MNRE). Renewable energy promotion 
received a boost with the National Electricity Policy 2005, which obliges licensed utilities and 
producers of captive electricity to purchase certain amounts of renewable energy. In recent years, a 
number of specific federal and state-level incentive schemes have been created for specific pur-
poses, ranging from rooftop PV installations to large-scale power plants. The National Rural Elec-
trification Policy of 2006 offered a range of incentives for renewal energy projects, and a genera-
tion-based incentive scheme was introduced in 2008. In 2009, the Government of India launched 
the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, or NSM (see MNRE 2010). The NSM is the most 
comprehensive policy to date and marks the first coherent and ambitious attempt by the federal 
government to increase solar power generation and develop domestic capabilities and capacities in 
solar technology. The NSM’s aim is to increase solar power generation (from PV and Concentrat-
ing Solar Power/CSP technologies) so that retail grid parity (currently about USD 0.12/kWh) is 
achieved by 2022 and parity with coal generation (currently about USD 0.05/kWh) by 2030. The 
NSM intends to trigger 20 GW on-grid and 2 GW off-grid solar energy plants by 2022. 
At the federal level, solar energy promotion includes a range of instruments:6  
• Preferential feed-in tariffs. Tariffs for photovoltaic and solar thermal power plants are guaran-
teed for 25 years. Thus far the tariff level has been established through reverse auctions (see 
Section 3.1). 
• Renewable Purchase Obligations (RPO) and the Renewable Energy Certificate (REC). To 
increase pan-Indian demand for renewable energy and also encourage project development, 
so-called ‘obligated entities’ must purchase a certain minimum share of renewable energy. To 
fulfil their RPO, obligated entities may produce renewable energy themselves, purchase di-
rectly from power producers or buy RECs through a renewable-power-producers exchange 
(Section 3.2).  
• Domestic content requirements. Among the NSM’s ambitions is developing domestic techno-
logical capabilities for solar energy. Access to preferential tariffs linked to domestic content 
requirements provides an incentive to produce in India. Auctions for solar thermal power 
plants stipulate a minimum domestic content of 30%. For PV-power plants, the first round of 
auctions required that crystalline modules be sourced nationally while cells could be im-
ported; in the second bid, crystalline cells had to be locally manufactured, too, and only thin-
                                                            
6  Some incentives can be cumulated, while others are alternative options. Most importantly, beneficiaries 
can only apply for preferential feed-in-tariffs or RECs trading.   
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film technology was allowed to be imported. The NSM also offers a range of supply-side in-
centives for technology development. 
• Other incentives. Tax holidays, attractive options for the accelerated depreciation of invest-
ments, soft loan schemes and simplified procedures for project clearance are also granted. 
Renewable energy projects may be awarded generous long-term leases for land at symbolic 
rates. The NSM partly assures payment risks, which are key to project bankability.  
Besides the federal government NSM, several Indian states are also pursuing solar policies that 
provide additional or alternative incentives. Gujarat, in particular, stands out with a solar policy 
that has created incentives for even more installations than the NSM. Karnataka and Rajasthan also 
have dedicated solar policies. These state packages differ from each other and from the federal 
ones. For example, Gujarat offers a predetermined feed-in-tariff instead of following the reverse 
auction system of the federal government and most other states, and has no domestic content re-
quirement; Rajasthan and Gujarat have established solar parks as special economic zones with 
dedicated infrastructures; Rajasthan reserves part of its solar bids for companies that produce a 
certain share of their equipment locally (Bridge to India 2012a). India’s diversity of policy ap-
proaches provides an interesting laboratory for testing the effectiveness of various ways of manag-
ing renewable-energy rents. 
3 Solar energy policy in India - A rent management perspective 
Developing new energy sources that are fairly expensive at first but are desirable for long-term 
energy security and environmental protection is particularly challenging in view of the pressure to 
invest available resources in cheap, short-term solutions that address basic development needs, 
including large numbers of households with no access to energy or frequent power cuts, and social 
deprivations in areas unrelated to energy, such as health, education and nutrition. It is also difficult 
when consumers – many of whom are poor – are extremely price-sensitive and are used to sub-
stantial energy subsidies whether they are poor or not (Bandyopadhyay 2010).  
This is precisely the situation in India. The following two sections explore how, despite these re-
strictions, rents for renewable energy development are created, and how they are allocated among 
competing interest groups. Two aspects are especially relevant: 
1. How governments (both federal and state) determine the right levels of preferential feed-in 
tariffs for solar energy. The challenge is to create sufficient rents to leverage a considerable 
flow of commercial investments into this industry, while keeping energy prices affordable 
(Section 3.1). 
2. How the RPO are set, and how this impacts the creation and transfer of rents. The system of 
tradable quotas is meant to set ‘fair’ incentives for states with very different initial conditions 
for the generation of renewable energy. Defining the RPO level is a state matter, with RPO 
varying significantly from state to state, reflecting not just differences in energy sources but 
also in political ambitions. An interesting aspect of the political economy of RPO is that the 
instrument creates a perverse incentive for state governments: If State A sets ambitious tar-
gets, the obligated entities in its jurisdiction may end up purchasing RECs from entities in 
State B that have made less effort to develop renewable energy, but have nominal excess quo-
tas because the state government set modest targets (Section 3.2). 
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3.1 Determining the right level of rents 
Determining the right level of rents is difficult. Levels that are too low may fail to attract the re-
quired investments, while rents that are too high may indicate an unproductive transfer of re-
sources from households – that are often very poor – to technology companies. Finding the right 
balance is further complicated by the fact that many price determinants are largely unknown. No 
reliable long-term solar irradiation data exist for solar energy projects. It is also unclear if PV-
module prices will continue to fall rapidly, how the prices of other energy sources will evolve, if 
the grid will be able to cope with the infirm power generated by PV plants and how solar energy 
performs in niche markets. Hence, it is difficult to establish the appropriate level and duration of 
subsidies.  
Under the NSM, the Indian government promotes different types of solar energy projects. The 
NSM has defined three development phases, with targets gradually increasing from 1,300 MW in 
Phase 1 (to March 2013), an additional 3,700 MW in Phase 2 (to 2017) and 17,000 MW in Phase 
3, thus reaching a total of 22,000 MW in 2022. Phase 1 projects have been divided into 500 MW 
for utility-scale PV projects and 500 for solar-thermal power plants (Concentrating Solar Power, 
CSP), with the remaining 300 MW for small roof-top and off-grid projects. Then the Phase 1 allo-
cations were split into two batches. The first batch included 150 MW of PV and 470 MW of CSP 
projects. The PV part in particular, with a maximum project size of just 5 MW, can be considered 
a test run. At the start of the program, the government offered a fixed feed-in tariff of EUR 
0.27/kWh for PV projects and EUR 0.24/kWh for CSP projects. These tariffs were based on the 
first estimates of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, or CERC, of the capital costs of 
the technologies, the cost of the debt and the expectations of market return. There was some con-
cern that the NSM might not be able to attract enough investors. But the response to the initial 
tariffs was so positive that the challenge became selecting the investors.7 Companies were re-
quested to offer discounts on the previous feed-in tariff, and the winning bidders were offered 25-
year guaranteed tariffs. In the second round of projects, the remaining 350 MW of PV projects 
were offered, now with an increased project size of up to 20 MW and allowing individuals or con-
sortia to bid for a maximum of three projects adding up to 50 MW.  
Such competitive reverse bidding had been successfully implemented in conventional energy pro-
jects. The advantage of this mechanism over predefined feed-in tariffs is that it elicits the price 
market at which actors are willing to develop projects – something that policymakers cannot oth-
erwise ascertain because they lack information about all the relevant project parameters (Lesser / 
Su 2008, 985 ff.). Some investors may be willing to sacrifice profits in their first projects in order 
to secure entry into an emerging market. Competitive reverse bidding helps governments establish 
the level of rents needed to attract sufficient investment for the solar industry.  
The first auction led to a strong drop in tariffs. Applications were made for more than 5,000 MW – 
more than 30 times the available project volume. Successful bidders offered PV projects at prices 
between EUR 0.17 and 0.20/kWh. In the second bid, the average tariff bid dropped to EUR 
0.14/kWh. The lowest tariff bid was EUR 0.11/kWh for PV and EUR 0.17/kWh for CSP.  
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At first glance, the reverse auctions were very successful, overwhelming the expectations of the 
MNRE and most observers. The low bids reflect the strong international trend of falling prices for 
PV-modules (Figure 3) and cost reductions anticipated from the scale and localisation of parts for 
CSP plants (Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2012). 
Figure 3: Declining PV module prices in India 
 
 
Source: own market research 
Doubts remain about the viability of solar energy projects at such low prices. In fact, the ‘adven-
turous bidding’ observed in other countries that experimented with reverse auctions, resulted in 
projects not being implemented or being unduly delayed (Kreycik / Couture / Cory 2011; Becker / 
Fischer 2012). Low bids can also jeopardise the bankability of future projects. The Indian govern-
ment applied some safeguards to reduce the risk of adventurous bidding: it requested bidding fees 
and also bank guarantees that would be lost in different tranches in case of delays.  
Notwithstanding these precautions, there have been delays after NSM auctions. Only twelve of the 
30 projects auctioned in Batch 1 fulfilled their legal requirements on time. Investors claim that the 
delays were due to difficulties with land acquisition and inadequate power evacuation or transmis-
sion infrastructure. While this may account for some of the delays, their large number and the na-
ture of the investors who submitted the lowest bids – many of whom had no prior experience in the 
solar industry – suggest that some bids were indeed ‘adventurous’.  
Most delays have been penalised – which is necessary to discourage adventurous bidding in the 
future. The regulations foresee that bidders lose their bank guarantees in tranches of 20% for a 
delay of one month, 40% for the second month and the remaining 40% for the third month. Some 
14 projects saw the first tranche of their bank guarantees drawn, a total of EUR 4.3 million. Seven 
projects in Rajasthan initially managed to shirk penalty payments although they were late because 
they received commissioning certificates from the competent state authority (Bridge to India 
2012b, 9). While by imposing penalty payments the federal government seems determined to send 
investors an unambiguous message that adventurous bidding will not be tolerated, at the state level 
loopholes may still exist. Besides the NSM, projects have been delayed under the Gujarat Solar 
Policy, where the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission imposed penalties on 370 MW 
worth of projects for missing the 31 December 2012 deadline to commission.  
In order to judge whether bids were miscalculated or presented realistic project costs, it is neces-
sary to examine the bidders’ rationale. To this end, interviews with company representatives and 
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sector experts were conducted in early 2012. The comments should be treated with caution as bid-
ders may have been unwilling to fully disclose their strategic considerations, and some allegations 
cannot be verified – especially when interviewees hinted at money laundering and speculation. 
Nevertheless, the assessment by industry insiders provides insights into the diversity of potential 
motives for especially low project bids:8 
1. Some investors had no experience in the energy business and may have simply underesti-
mated project development costs or expected that penalties would not be enforced. 
2. Some industry players appear to be pursuing long-term strategic goals: one is to use solar 
energy projects to get a foot into India's heavily regulated energy industry; another is to gain 
visibility as a pioneering investor in an emerging industry, which could help the company get 
listed on the stock exchange and attract international funding or sell to a market aggregator at 
a later stage. Some companies may be willing to absorb losses in their first bids in order to 
make headway towards their long-term goals. 
3. There may also have been tactical bidding from bidders willing to take a bet that costs would 
continue to fall between the tariff auction and the actual purchase of equipment. Some bidders 
further leveraged on the deferred payment schemes that module manufacturers offered and 
the low interest rates based on the strength of their balance sheets. (The rapid reduction in 
module costs in 2011 ‘saved’ such bidders). 
4. Indian PV-module manufacturers have been severely hit by the recent fall in demand in 
Europe, which is by far their main export market. Some winning (low) bids have come from 
module manufacturers, for whom investing in their own PV projects serves to allocate surplus 
production and diversify risks. Some international module manufacturers have offered their 
lowest prices on the Indian market – perhaps because there they see a strategic advantage in 
having early reference projects or because they see India as a volume (rather than a margin) 
market that helps them achieve high levels of manufacturing-plant utilisation that holds down 
unit costs. 
5. Some bidders are captive consumers (e.g. owners of textile factories) who can use PV plants 
as back-up energy suppliers for their own electricity needs. These investors may use the en-
ergy thus generated to complement diesel back-ups and sell to the grid at fairly low prices 
when their electricity supply is functioning well. For this group, the small project size of the 
first batch was especially advantageous. 
6. Solar energy projects may be used for money laundering, that is, creating legal investments 
for unregistered income. 
7. Some investors may be interested in the investment’s co-benefits – especially long-term 
leases on cheap land that later could used for other purposes.  
8. Some investors are intermediaries who hope to resell the concessions in the future at higher 
prices. Although restrictions on the sale of projects are intended to discourage this practice, 
some project owners have found ways to circumvent them. 
                                                            
8  Interviews with investors and/or project developers (see the disclaimer for details) in 2011 and 2012 
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It is not possible to assess the relative importance of these motives; in many cases, a combination 
of them may have led to low bids. Most of these motivations imply investor rationale to develop 
solar power projects, while doubts surface about the nature of the commitment when an investor is 
mainly interested in leasing land or reselling concessions (Nos. 7 and 8). But even in such cases, 
investors may still develop their investment projects, especially if threatened with penalty pay-
ments. The main risk to NSM objectives comes from inexperienced bidders. The penalty payments 
mean that undeveloped projects do not burden the taxpayer, but non-compliance can retard solar 
energy deployment. While any early-stage industry should expect some hitches in its development, 
there probably is a tipping point beyond which solar technology as a whole will lose the trust of 
investors and banks in India.  
It seems that Indian solar policy is set to achieve its targets despite some delays. Installed solar 
capacity in the country increased from 18 MW in late 2010 to over 1 GW in August 2012.9 The 
NSM has boosted investor interest for the next implementation phases, and since investments are 
picking up, the government has been able to lower tariffs in an unprecedented fashion, from EUR 
0.24 to 0.11/kWh (the lowest bid for PV). Following the success of competitive bidding at the 
federal level, Rajasthan and Karnataka are emulating that model, with other state governments 
likely to follow. Rajasthan has already announced that it may also apply competitive reverse bid-
ding to wind parks. 
3.2 Pushing the states for RPO and establishing a trading mechanism 
To further encourage renewable energy, the federal government, through the Central Electricity 
Regulatory Commission (CERC), has introduced RPO for renewable energy in general, and solar 
power in particular. RPO are the minimum percentage of solar energy that obligated entities –
distribution licensees, open access and captive10 consumers (1MW and above) – must have in their 
electricity mix. Some of these entities are private, such as Reliance Power and Tata Power, while 
the most important ones are state-owned. 
Indian energy policy is concurrent: the federal government develops guidelines, which have a po-
litical signalling function, and all state governments and obligated entities are expected to shift 
towards renewable energy. Setting concrete targets and implementing them, however, is left to 
state governments, particularly the State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs). For the 
time being, RPO for solar energy are not very ambitious (0.25% of the energy mix) because the 
Indian energy market is very price-sensitive and solar energy is still expensive, even compared 
with other renewables. In general, RPO for renewables vary widely from state to state; some have 
set RPO at 10% or more (see Table 1 below). 
Complementing the RPO, Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) have been introduced for trading 
purchase obligations amongst obligated entities, with separate certificates for solar and non-solar 
energy generation. Obligated entities that have difficulties meeting the targets set by state regula-
tors which can purchase RECs to offset their obligations. Conversely, RECs create an incentive for 
                                                            
9 http://www.mnre.gov.in/mission-and-vision-2/achievements/ (accessed 25 September 2012) 
10 Open-access customers purchase electricity directly from an independent power producer (IPP) instead 
of the local utility. Captive consumers own the plant and generate and consume power on-site and lo-
cally. 
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power producers in resource-rich states to increase renewable energy production beyond the state 
targets and sell their certificates to other states. Utilities with renewable energy projects can choose 
to apply for a preferential feed-in tariff or sell RECs.  
Implementing the system of RPO and RECs is a challenging task. From the perspective of rent 
management, two issues are particularly tricky: 
1. Ensuring that state governments set fair RPO that reflect their specific situations and avoiding 
strategic behaviour which would allow some states to maximise rents at the expense of others. 
2. Establishing the credibility needed to establish a trading scheme. 
Regarding the first challenge, India’s federal states are not equally endowed with renewable en-
ergy resources. Some states are well endowed with wind sites, hydro-power or constant solar irra-
diation, while others have very limited renewable energy potentials. RPO need to take this into 
account; indeed, state targets and actual RPO achievements vary greatly (Table 1).  
Table 1: Status of RPO in selected states (2010–2011) 
State RPO target (%) RPO achieved (%) 
Karnataka 10.0 11.0 
Haryana 10.0 0.2 
Maharashtra 6.0 5.0 
Tamil Nadu 13.0 12.0 
Madhya Pradesh 10.0 0.2 
Gujarat 2.0 2.0 
Punjab 2.0 1.0 
Rajasthan 9.0 n.d. 
Source: Bridge to India (2012a) 
When states are free to set their own targets, while state-level entities that do not comply with 
RPO are required to purchase RECs elsewhere, there is a perverse incentive for all states to set 
their targets as low as possible: The mere stroke of a pen would reduce their outlays for purchasing 
certificates or increase income from tradable surplus production.  
Table 1 shows how state governments treat RPO very differently. In early 2012, some states still 
had not set a target. Gujarat and Punjab have very low targets. Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, where 
wind energy is well established, have higher yet conservative targets that they have more or less 
achieved. In contrast, Haryana and Madhya Pradesh have set ambitious renewable energy targets 
although they are still in the early phases of developing renewables. The case of Tamil Nadu indi-
cates that states behave strategically to improve their positions in the emerging RECs market: 
when the decision was taken to introduce RECs, Tamil Nadu lowered its targets. 
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Why are some states willing to set more ambitious goals than others although their obligated enti-
ties (most of which are heavily indebted state-owned enterprises) may be forced to transfer rents to 
other states? Interviewees offered the following explanations, which largely refer to informal 
power relations and ties, on condition11 they were quoted anonymously: 
1. Some state governments have embraced the promotion of renewable energy – and/or climate 
change action in general – more than others. For example, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Karnataka 
have their own solar policies. Gujarat regards solar energy projects as an economic opportu-
nity and is striving to develop first-mover advantages. It is the first state in India to set up a 
separate department for climate change, and its Chief Minister describes himself as a leading 
promoter of climate change action.12 The Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission also has 
been strict in imposing penalties on companies that fail to meet the agreed deadline for project 
implementation (Bridge to India 2012b, 8). States that promote renewables as a policy priority 
most likely are not very concerned by the risk of having to make payments to other states.  
2. The targets were set by the SERC who are independent regulators and do not merely imple-
ment policies of the respective state government. The SERCs often mediate between CERC 
(the central government regulator) and state utilities. The SERC’s degree of independence, 
however, varies from state to state: in some states, the SERC is headed by former CEOs of 
state utilities who may tend to protect those utilities.  
3. The CERC grants the states specific shares of electricity to be fed into or taken from the national 
grid. This competence implies a position of power that the CERC may use to nudge a SERC to 
comply with federal policy guidelines. States’ responsiveness to such nudging, however, varies 
depending on a range of economic (e.g. whether states are net energy importers or exporters) and 
political factors (e.g. the closeness of state governments to the federal government). 
4. Not all state governments are convinced that RPO will actually be enforced. Since state utili-
ties are already heavily indebted and passing along higher energy prices to consumers is politi-
cally sensitive, many interviewees expect that RPO will be negotiated on a case-by-case basis 
and state utilities may be exempted. Selective enforcement would undermine the credibility of 
the RECs market and in that case, over- or under-achieving RPO targets would not have major 
economic consequences. 
The second rent management challenge related to RPO/RECs is to ensure the credibility of RPO 
enforcement, which is indispensable for developing a trading scheme. If obligated entities can 
negotiate exemptions in some states, establishing a certificate-trading scheme will be difficult. 
RPO have not yet been enforced, and many interviewees doubt that they ever will be. As a result, 
the RECs market is evolving very slowly. In February 2011, RECs trading was launched on the 
Indian Energy Exchange, but trade volumes remain low. The first solar RECs were traded in May 
2012 – in negligible quantities.13  
                                                            
11  This information comes from interviews with MNRE, CERC and SERC officials, as well as senior 
energy analysts from international organisations and consultancy firms in Delhi.  
12  In 2010, Chief Minister Narendra Modi published a book titled “Convenient action: Gujarat’s response 
to challenges of climate change” (Modi 2010). 
13  http://www.iexindia.com/Reports/RECData.aspx 
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On the other hand, there are some stakeholders – both state governments and private sector – who 
do invest in renewable projects because they expect that RPO will be enforced. In order to meet its 
solar RPO, the government of Odisha (formerly Orissa) has allotted five PV projects cumulatively 
worth 25 MW in Rajasthan. The private energy actors, Reliance Power and Tata Power, are also 
investing in solar projects to offset their own RPO. The fact that they are registered under the 
RECs trading scheme implies that they forego preferential feed-in tariffs and shows that these 
companies are betting on a functioning RECs market in the future. If such a market develops, early 
investors may benefit from the short supply of RECs and concomitant high prices. Supply short-
ages may persist for some time, since new projects need about a year from their conception and 
clearance before they produce RECs. 
In sum, we do not yet know whether RPO and RECs can be implemented successfully. Much de-
pends on the federal–state power relations, and on the ability and willingness of energy system 
actors in each state to absorb higher deficits or pass along higher energy prices to the consumers. 
Doubts remain regarding universal enforceability. However, the introduction of RPO and RECs 
trading, backed by statements from the federal government that it is determined to implement 
these instruments, has led to additional solar investments, and states as well as large private inves-
tors are getting prepared for emerging RECs markets. 
4 Conclusions 
New resource-saving technologies are needed in order to prevent irreversible damage to global 
ecosystems. Some of these technologies are still far from commercial maturity, which means that 
governments may need to create rents to make investments in these technologies ‘artificially’ at-
tractive. Temporary rents allow for testing the new technologies, learning, and increasing the 
economies of scale that are necessary for commercial success. Solar energy technologies are a 
prime example: Because solar energy is climate-neutral and abundant, it is a key element in the 
future energy mix. As long as environmental costs are not figured in, solar energy will not be able 
to compete with fossil fuels. To bring solar energy in India to grid parity over the next few years, 
various forms of temporary rents have been created, including preferential feed-in tariffs and the 
option of selling RECs. 
The creation of such rents, however, risks faulty allocation and political capture, especially in solar 
and other technologies that are far from being price competitive. Because governments are not 
fully informed about the cost structures of various solar technologies at different locations, they do 
not know how to set the necessary amount of subsidies or protection, or the timetable for with-
drawing rents without jeopardising the emerging industry.   
This article has examined rent management in India's solar energy policy, in particular its National 
Solar Mission. This policy exemplifies the complexities of managing rent to develop and deploy 
green technologies. It shows that the creation and distribution of rents is an eminently political proc-
ess with great leeway for policy choices. How rents are actually allocated, and the extent to which 
they serve strategic long-term goals rather than facilitate unproductive rent-seeking, depends on how 
the policies are designed and the power constellations among various interest groups.  
Not all the projects that were allocated were actually constructed. There were also a number of 
glitches in executing the policy, such as certifying commissioning before commissioning actually 
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took place, or allowing too many project rights to be collected in the first batch by a single project 
developer, Lanco, who then created bogus companies to win more bids.14 This is an early-stage 
industry: both the private sector and the institutions need to learn the ropes. An analysis based on 
Bridge to India’s extensive project database indicates that the industry is rapidly maturing. The 
share of project developers with significant industry and project financing experience (with a high 
project-completion ratio) is increasing, while that of developers who have very little solar exper-
tise is decreasing. 
Thus far the NSM has been remarkably effective in stimulating solar investments and managing 
the necessary subsidies. It has managed to put solar energy on the political agenda and create a 
functioning ecosystem of technology companies, lenders/investors and regulators. While Indian 
governments had supported small-scale solar energy projects for many years, the NSM was the 
first coherent policy approach to give the industry a real boost. It sent a strong signal that the gov-
ernment of India is determined to develop solar energy as a relevant part of the national energy 
mix. Moreover, the NSM established a clear target – achieving retail grid parity in 2022 – as well 
as concrete milestones for three phases of deploying solar energy by 2022.  
Despite the political sensitivity of raising retail prices of electricity, the NSM recognised the need 
for rents and successfully organised the first rounds of competitive reverse bidding with the dual 
purpose of mobilising investors and eliciting information about the necessary rent levels. Thus far 
the auctions have been successful, with huge investor interest and bids for more than 5,000 MW in 
the first batch – that had only tendered 150 MW of PV projects. Although actual project imple-
mentation is behind schedule, solar investments are clearly picking up, surpassing 1GW of in-
stalled capacity in August 2012.  
The auctions were even more successful with regard to their second objective of determining the 
lowest tariff rate at which investors would pursue solar projects. The government has been able to 
bring down tariffs – and thus public subsidies – from EUR 0.24 to 0.11/kWh for the lowest cost 
bid. Due to this cost digression, analysts now expect retail grid parity to be achieved around 2017, 
five years earlier than the NSM had envisaged. While external observers cannot know the cost 
calculations of each and every investor so as to assess the level of rents created for the Indian solar 
industry, many analysts assume that some of the lowest bidding projects will make losses, and that 
in any event, returns on investment are unlikely to be above average.15 Interviews indicate that 
many investors are willing to sacrifice short-term profits for the long-term gains they hope to reap 
as early movers in an emerging industry. 
Policy design and implementation also reflect a good deal of experimentation and learning. As 
CEEW/NRDC (2012) observes in its assessment of Phase 1 of the NSM, the mission “follows a 
phased approach that allows the government to modify guidelines and policies based on the ex-
periences gained and lessons learned in earlier phases”. Most observers agree that competitive 
reverse bidding was well designed, starting with a small test run that brought down prices signifi-
cantly, raising interest among a broad range of potential investors and helping to identify some 
loopholes in the bidding process that were eliminated in subsequent periods. In the second batch, 
project volumes were increased to address larger, experienced bidders. The NSM approach of 
                                                            
14  http://cseindia.org/userfiles/LANCO.pdf 
15  Mr Soumya Banerjee, energy analyst at the International Finance Corporation, Delhi (interview 4 April 
2012) and Mr Rao Karbar, Asian Development Bank, Delhi (interview 29 March 2012) 
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competitive reverse bidding has been adopted by several state governments, and states such as 
Gujarat, that are using an auction system, benefit from the reference price established by the NSM 
auctions. At first, reverse bidding auctions were heavily criticised by industry players who would 
have preferred predetermined fixed tariffs for taking initial decisions on whether or not to enter the 
market. In retrospect, however, it seems that this did not stop many investors from taking part. Our 
interviews reveal that the Indian solar market is regarded as so promising and strategically impor-
tant that investors were willing to accept the inconvenience and risk of the auction process.16 
Some winning bids of the solar auctions may not materialise because of inexperienced bidders’ 
miscalculations. However, it appears that this is not causing the market to derail, and instead is 
regarded as a teething problem of a maturing market. The industry is awaiting the first actual gen-
eration data from plants to understand if the low tariffs have affected construction quality. This 
data will significantly impact on banks’ readiness to lend to future solar projects on a non-recourse 
basis – which could boost the industry to the next stage. 
Significant uncertainty remains with regard to the actual implementation of Renewable Purchase 
Obligations and the Renewable Energy Certificate trading mechanism, which depends on RPO 
enforcement. The fact that the first state utilities and private energy corporations are investing in 
RECs projects shows that big players in the energy system are preparing themselves for the RECs 
market. But many doubts remain about whether the RECs market will ever succeed on a large 
scale.  
Overcoming these problems requires the federal government’s capability to enforce policies. So 
far, the government of India has been consequent in penalising bidding companies for project de-
lays – although documentation exists about cases in which the competent state authority certified 
due project progress when investors had not made any tangible investments. It will be much more 
difficult to ensure that meaningful RPO are set in all states and to enforce RPO compliance against 
the predictable resistance of large, state-owned and loss-running utilities.    
So far, the NSM has been a success. Within just two years it has made India one of the top five 
global markets for solar energy and created a functioning ecosystem at highly competitive costs. 
The first experiences indicate that ‘green rents’ can be managed fairly effectively, and govern-
ments can find ways to trigger new industries at a pre-commercial stage – while also keeping sub-
sidies at an affordable level. This is an important lesson for the green-transformation agendas of 
many other developing countries.  
 
 
 
                                                            
16  Interviews with investors, project developers, banks and EPC contractors in 2011 and 2012 (see dis-
claimer for details) 
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